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Abstract / Résumé
We investigate the impact of occupational safety and health (OSH)
and environmental regulation on the rate of growth of total factor productivity
(TFP) in the Quebec manufacturing sector during the 1985-88 period. Our
results show that environmental regulation and OSH protective reassignments
(a prevention policy with respect to OSH) have led to a reduction in productivity
growth, while the presence of mandatory prevention programs and of fines for
infractions to OSH rules have led to an increase in productivity growth.
Interestingly, this is, to our knowledge, the first result showing that OSH
regulation may have had a positive effect on productivity growth.
Nous évaluons limpact quont eu les réglementations en matière de
santé et sécurité du travail et denvironnement sur la croissance de la productivité
totale des facteurs (PTF) du secteur manufacturier québécois au cours des années
1985-88. Nos résultats montrent que la réglementation environnementale et les
réaffectations préventives (une mesure de prévention des accidents de travail) ont
réduit la croissance de la productivité, alors que les mesures de prévention
obligatoires et limportance des amendes imposées pour infraction aux normes du
travail ont augmenté la productivité. Notre étude est la première, à notre
connaissance, qui indique un effet potentiellement positif de la réglementation sur
la croissance de la productivité.
Keywords: environmental regulation, safety and health regulation, productivity.
Mots clé : réglementation environnementale, réglementation de la santé et de la
sécurité du travail, productivité.
A similar slowdown was also observed in Canada (see Stuber, 1986).1
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I. Introduction
The impact of regulation on productivity growth has been a subject of
growing interest during the last decade for various reasons. First, some authors (e.g.,
Christainsen and Haveman, 1981) suggested that regulation might be (partly)
responsible for the preoccupying productivity slowdown of the American economy in
the 1970s. Second, we need to know what is the effect of regulation on productivity1
in order to provide a complete cost-benefit analysis of regulation (examples of such
an analysis include Mendeloff, 1988 and Viscusi, 1986).
Several studies have investigated the impact of regulation activities on
productivity growth. Most of these studies are American and were published in the late
1970s or in the 1980s. These studies vary in a number of ways, including the
definition of productivity that is used, the type of regulation (mostly environmental),
the industries considered and the magnitude of their results.
In a pioneering study, Denison (1978) estimates that about 16 percent of the
productivity slowdown in the U.S. non-residential business sector during the 1972-75
period was due to regulation from OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health
Administration) and EPA (Environmental Protection Agency). Christainsen and
Haveman (1981) find, using measures of the amount of total federal U.S. regulation,
that regulation reduced the rate of growth of labor productivity in the U.S.
manufacturing sector by 0.27 % per year during the 1958-77 period. Gollop and
Roberts (1983) estimate that the American Clean Air Act reduced productivity growth
by 0.59 % per year during the 1973-1979 period in the fossil fuelled electric utilities
industry. Gray (1987) finds that about 30 % of the decline in productivity growth in
the U.S. manufacturing sector during the 1970s may be attributed to OSHA and EPA
regulation. As for Canada, Sims and Smith (1985) show that pollution charges did
not affect significantly the productivity of four firms in the Canadian brewing industry.
Moreover, Conrad and Morrison (1989), in a study of the manufacturing sectors of the
U.S., Germany and Canada, find that pollution investment expenditures had virtually
no effect on productivity growth in Canada during the 1967-80 period.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the impact of regulation on
productivity growth in Canada, specifically in the Quebec manufacturing sector. To
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to assess empirically the impact of OSH
regulation on Canadian productivity. The analysis is based on Gray (1986, 1987), who
posits a relation between the rate of growth of total factor productivity (TFP) and a
variety of indicators measuring the intensity of the occupational safety and health and
The right to refuse hazardous tasks allows a worker to refuse to carry out a certain task if he or she2
believes that this task is abnormally dangerous. The joint worksite safety committees usually assume the
following responsibilities: obtaining and disseminating information on OSH, identifying the sources of
hazard to workers and making recommendations on means of eliminating hazards to the employer. The
equal representation of management and workers on a committee is compulsory. A prevention program
must meet the approval of the OSH board and must address the training and supervision of workers,
inspections, accident investigations, personal protective equipment as well as the maintenance and disclosure
of records. In Quebec, prevention programs (as well as the safety committees which implement the
programs) are imposed only on firms with more than 20 employees in the fifteen most risky industries.
Protective reassignment gives a worker the right to be transferred to another job within the same firm if he
or she can provide a medical certificate that attests the potential medical harm his or her job could cause.
So far, this right can only be used by pregnant women. It is noteworthy that most of these safety policies are
targeted, or have a larger incidence, in risky industries like mining, forestry or the chemical industry.
In Gray (1987), serial correlation is less likely to be a problem since the dependent variable is the3
change in annual TFP growth: 1959-69 to 1973-78, while we adopt a similar estimation strategy with panel
data as Gray (1986, chap. 7).
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environmental regulations. Apart from the data set, the present analysis differs from
Grays in four respects. First, while Gray argues that regulation has necessarily a
negative impact on productivity growth, our theoretical discussion allows for positive
impacts. Second, the set of variables we use to assess the impact of OSH regulation
is more extensive than Grays in order to capture the variety of means by which the
Quebec OSH Board (the Commission de la Santé et Sécurité du Travail or CSST)
deals with workplace safety problems. Indeed, this Board has been innovative with the
adoption of different safety policies, some of them unique in North America, such as
compulsory prevention programs, safety committees, the right to protective
reassignments, and the right of refusal. Third, two independent variables are included2
in the estimated equation to control for the impact of economies of scale and business
cycle fluctuations on TFP growth. Fourth, in contrast with Gray (1986), we use the
cross-sectionally heteroskedastic and time-wise autoregressive estimation procedure
presented in Kmenta [1986, pp. 616-625] in order to prevent potential problems of
serial correlation or heteroskedasticity.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses theoretically
the expected impact of OSH and environmental regulation on TFP. It also presents the
estimated equation and the data set (from 19 sectors of the Quebec manufacturing
industry for the period 1985-88). The empirical results are presented in Section II.
They show that environmental regulation has a negative impact on productivity
growth, while certain measures adopted by the OSH authorities have a positive
impact, which is a new result in this literature. Finally, Section III provides concluding
remarks.
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II. Theoretical Discussion, Specification of the TFP Equation and
Data
As in most of the literature, we measure total factor productivity growth
(TFP) by the Törnqvist index:0
The subscripts i and t refer to industries and time periods, and the j refer to inputs. The
"s are the inputs cost shares.
A host of factors account for observed variations in TFP (see Cowing and0
Stevenson, 1981; Denny et al., 1981; and Ouellette and Lasserre, 1985): changes in
the scale of production, technological shocks, fluctuations in the rate of use of quasi-
fixed inputs, non-marginal cost pricing, and regulatory shocks, among other things.
The derivation of a precise relationship between these determinants of
productivity and our measure of TFP would require a complete characterization of the0
technology of the Quebec manufacturing industry - which is beyond to scope of this
paper. We use the theoretical results of productivity analysis to shed light on the
relationship between productivity growth, our regulation variables and other control
variables.
As shown in Gray (1987), the impact of OSH and environmental regulation
on productivity growth is expected to be negative since regulation is likely to induce
firms to invest in non-productive inputs. For instance, regulation can impose
constraints on the firms choice of production processes, make it harder to take
advantage of new innovations, cause firms to lower new investments by increasing
uncertainty, etc. (p. 999). Therefore, compliance with regulation leads to an increase
in the rate of growth of inputs with no counterpart on the output side or, in other
words, since regulation introduces an extra constraint in the minimization problem of
the firm, it necessarily leads to lower productivity. Of course, if the social benefits of
regulation were fully taken into account as an additional output, the preceding
conclusions would no longer be true.
Although this view is prevailing in the literature, one can imagine situations
in which regulation may induce firms to adopt productivity-enhancing measures that
This line of reasoning, involving inter-firm externalities, may also explain why compliance to acid rain4
regulation, for instance, may lead to lengthened lives of structures that would otherwise be eroded by acid
rain and thus, to lower costs and higher productivity for firms.
See Viscusi, 1983, Carmichael, 1986 or Lanoie, 1991 for economic arguments showing that, left5
alone, firms would not provide an optimal amount of safety in the workplace, so that government
intervention is justified to improve the level of safety.
In other words, in the absence of regulation, information known to the workers and unknown to the6
employer is not used by the employer. Legislation giving workers the right of refusal, for instance, allows
this information to be used. Here, legislation, instead of adding new constraints, releases to some extent a
constraint that prevents the use of information.
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they would not have adopted otherwise. Meyers and Nakamura (1980), Sonnen (1991)
as well as Kennedy (1994) discuss the positive impact that environmental regulation
may have on productivity growth. In particular, it is possible that regulation induces
the firm to intensify its research and development activities, thus stimulating
productivity growth. Imagine a model (see Kennedy, 1994, for a formal argument)
where production costs depend negatively on the amount spent on research. In such
a model, environmental regulation raises the cost of production and this strengthens
the incentive to engage in cost-reducing research which, in turn, can offset the initial
increase in cost due to regulation, or even lead to a reduction in total cost. This last
outcome may happen, for instance, if the probability of a major technological
breakthrough (e.g., the use of waste material as a new source of combustion) increases
with the amount spent on research, or if there are spillovers between innovating firms
through the diffusion of knowledge.4
The same line of reasoning can be followed with respect to OSH regulation,
but probably to a lesser extent since occupational safety is conceivably less related to
technology than pollution control. In a Canadian context, however, it is interesting to
note that OSH regulation-induced innovation may be due to the forced participation
of workers in the solution of safety problems. Indeed, Canadian OSH authorities have
put much emphasis on this kind of participation through the adoption of the right of
refusal or the compulsory creation of joint safety committees. This participation, which
is somewhat imposed upon employers as a means to improve safety in the workplace ,5
may lead to a better identification of the sources of danger and more appropriate
suggestions as to how problems may be solved than those adopted by the firm
otherwise . Therefore, if this kind of regulation leads to a reduction of workplace6
accidents, it in turn induces a reduction of the costs incurred because of accidents.
These costs include both direct costs (wage compensation and medical care), which
are supported to some extent by the firm depending on the degree of experience
In North America, firms are considered liable for workplace accidents and pay insurance premia to7
a Workers Compensation Board which, in turn, pays compensation benefits to accident victims. Via an
experience rating mechanism, these premia are partially adjusted to reflect the firms own claim experience.
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(2)
rating , and indirect costs (halt of the production process, mechanical breakdown,7
training of a substitute worker, etc.). Certain authors (e.g., Brody et al., 1990) have
estimated that these indirect costs are at least as large as the direct costs.
Therefore, taking the preceding arguments into consideration, it is not clear
whether or not environmental and/or OSH regulation has a negative impact on
productivity growth. This remains an empirical issue.
Following our discussion, we define an equation relating the rate of growth
of TFP to indicators of the importance of regulation:
ENVIRONMENT and OSH are variables capturing the intensity of environmental
it it
and OSH regulation (to be defined in more details below); the term µ reflects omitted
i
fixed effects pertaining to industry i, whereasQ reflects omitted fixed influences that
t
vary across time, but not across industries; SCALE , CYCLE and ENERSHARE are
it it it
control variables, and e is a random error term. Note that, given the nature of our
it
dependent variable, all the independent variables (except, of course, the fixed effects)
are expressed in first difference.
TFP is calculated (see equation (1)) as the difference between real output0
it
growth and real input growth. Output is measured by the value (in real terms) of
industry shipments. Five inputs are considered: production workers, nonproduction
workers, nonenergy materials, energy and capital. The latter is calculated as the cost
of capital times the stock, and the different fiscal treatment of capital relatively to the
other inputs is taken into account. The detailed definition of these variables, their
means, standard deviation and statistical source, as well as those of the other variables
in the analysis, are provided in Table 1 at the end of the text. More details on the
computations of the TFP are provided in Dufour (1992).
Concerning the independent variables, ENVIRONMENT is the change in
it
the ratio of the value of investment in pollution-control equipment to the total cost in
industry i at time t. Unfortunately, this data is only available since 1985 and we
Our measure here is the percentage of firms in the industry that have adopted a prevention program.8
This policy was adopted in 1984 and firms that were affected by the program had three years to comply with
the rule. See footnote 2.
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suspect that it underestimates the real expenditures devoted to pollution control. This
is so because an investment in new production equipments that happen to reduce
pollution is not necessarily reported as an investment in pollution control, and because
our measure covers only capital expenditures and ignores labor and material costs.
Our estimate of the impact of regulation on productivity growth will not diverge from
the true impact if the numerator of ENVIRONMENT and the real expenditures on
it
pollution control are highly (positively) correlated.
Since no data is available on the cost of compliance with occupational safety
and health regulation, we capture the intensity of OSH regulation by a vector of safety-
enforcing measures adopted by the Quebec board responsible for OSH (the CSST).
As in Gray (1987), it is assumed that enforcement effort is likely to be positively
correlated with compliance costs. In Quebec, five types of safety-enforcing measures
can be documented: inspections (INSPECTIONS ); penalties (fines) imposed for
it
infractions or noncompliance with safety standards (INFRACTION ); applications of
it
the right to refuse a dangerous task (REFUSAL ); applications of the right to
it
protective reassignment (PROTECT ), and requirement for a prevention program
it
(PREVENT ) . Protective reassignments and refusals are not safety-enforcing
it
8
measures per se, but they can be interpreted as employees actions resulting from
government intervention. Note that Gray used only an inspection variable.
It is well-known that changes in the scale of production, the presence of
quasi-fixed inputs, and non-marginal cost pricing influence the measurement of TFP
growth (Denny et al., 1981; Ouellette and Lasserre, 1985). Therefore, to assess the
impact of regulation on productivity, we must control for these influences.
SCALE , defined as the change in the level of output, is included in the
it
estimated equation to capture the effect of economies of scale on productivity. We
expect the coefficient on SCALE to take a positive sign if economies of scale lead to
it
an increase in productivity growth, while the converse would indicate that there are
decreasing returns to scale. Since no variable could be found to control adequately for
the absence of marginal cost pricing, the industry dummies may serve as proxies to
capture this phenomenon.
It is also necessary to control for cyclical fluctuations in the presence of
quasi-fixed inputs. For instance, a temporary plant closing will drastically reduce a
firms productivity level since no output is produced, while the capital stock (or other
8fixed inputs) still has to be counted as an input. Therefore, the variable CYCLE ,
it
defined as the change in the utilization capacity index, is included on the right-hand
side of the equation. Its coefficient is expected to be positive since an increase in the
capacity utilization rate should lead to an increase in productivity growth. One should
note that the two preceding control variables are ignored by Gray (1987). Finally, as
in Gray (1987), the change in the cost share of energy ENERSHARE is included to
it
check for the possibility that energy-intensive industries have experienced higher rates
of growth in productivity following the reduction in oil prices in 1986 (Gray was
expecting the opposite because of the oil price increases in the 1970s).
The omitted fixed effects pertaining to industry i, µ , will be captured by the
i
use of industry dummy variables. The omitted fixed influences that vary across time
but not across industries, Q , will be captured by the use of time dummies. In
t
particular, the latters may capture technological progress. Note that our fixed-effects
specification departs from Grays (1986).
For estimation purposes, pooled time-series and cross-section data are used.
Annual data cover the period 1985-88 inclusively (the data for 1984 are also used for
the calculation of the TFP). The data cover 19 manufacturing industries (see the list
in Table 1). Hence, since we are using explanatory variables in first differences, the
sample contains 57 observations. All data can be found in publications by the CSST
and Statistics Canada. Interestingly, TFP has increased on average by .3 % per year
during the period under study, which is consistent with the results of Denny et al.
(1992), which show that the decline in the productivity of the Canadian manufacturing
sector observed in the 1970s has recently been reversed. Note the variance of TFP
growth across industries (.086): our sample clearly contains industries characterized
by rapid productivity growth and others by a sharp decline.
III. Empirical Results
The estimations are performed using a generalized least-squares (GLS)
procedure based on the cross-sectionally and time-wise autoregressive model
presented in Kmenta [1986, pp. 616-625]. Furthermore, as suggested by Gray (1987),
a Hausman (1978) exogeneity test was performed to check if productivity growth
might have had an influence on the level of regulation. It is indeed possible that less
productive firms react by reducing their expenses to comply with regulation. In turn,
the regulatory agency (namely, the CSST) may react by increasing its enforcement
measures. Furthermore, one may also suspect that the SCALE variable be endogenous
given that output growth enters directly in the calculation of TFP. We tested for the
non-exogeneity of the regulation and control variables. The test did reject the
The set of instruments includes the ratio of machinery to labor in the industry, the yearly average number9
of hours worked per week per worker, the percentage of female workers in the industry, the percentage of
unionized workers in the industry and the average firm size in the industry. Each of these variables is related
with a potentially endogenous variable, but not necessarily with TFP growth. For instance, the percentage
of female workers is associated with the use of protective reassignments (PROTECT). These instruments
were also used to perform the Hausman test. Complete results are available upon request.
Furthermore, in Grays (1986) panel data analysis, the coefficients of all the regulatory variables are not10
significant.
9
exogeneity of the variables PROTECT, PREVENT, SCALE, CYCLE, and
ENERSHARE, and these variables are instrumented in our final estimations .9
Table 2 presents six different specifications of equation (2) with various
groups of independent variables. Overall, the explanatory power of the different
specifications seems satisfactory, and the results are relatively stable across
specifications. Column (1) presents the full specification on which we will base the
rest of our discussion.
The variable capturing the amount of resources devoted to pollution-control
equipment, ENVIRONMENT, has a negative and significant coefficient. The
contribution of the ENVIRONMENT variable to productivity growth is estimated at
-0.001 at the sample means. This result is obtained by multiplying the regulation
coefficient by the mean value of the regulation measure (taken in first difference). The
magnitude of this effect is in general lower than that observed in American studies (see
the Introduction), but comparable to that obtained in other investigations based on
Canadian data (Smith and Sims, 1985; Conrad and Morrisson, 1989). This may be due
to the fact that U.S. environmental regulation and its enforcement is in general
considered more severe than its Canadian counterpart (for convincing arguments on
this matter, see Marchant, 1990). And since our data covers a more recent period than
the other studies, we may be capturing certain positive effects of environmental
regulation on productivity as those described in our theoretical discussion. Gray
(1987) also found the environmental regulation variable to affect negatively
productivity growth. But the coefficient on his environmental variable is unstable and
not statistically significant when other regressors are included.10
Three of the OSH regulation variables are statistically significant. One has
a negative coefficient (PROTECT) and two, INFRACTION and PREVENT, a
positive and significant coefficient. The sum of the implied contribution of the last two
on productivity is 0.007 (at the sample means). This result suggests that these two
measures have reduced the incidence of workplace accidents, leading to a reduction
of direct and indirect costs related to accidents sufficient to have an enhancing effect
on productivity growth. Interestingly, Lanoie (1992a) shows that the inspections,
This result was obtained with a sample of data covering 28 industries for the period 1983-87.11
In particular, it is well recognized that protective reassignment is a measure that do not prevent many12
accidents, but that increases labor costs (see Lanoie, 1992a).
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which give rise to detected infractions and fines, have reduced the frequency of
accidents. To our knowledge, this is the first result showing that OSH regulation may11
have a positive impact on productivity.
The coefficient on the rate of protective reassignment (PROTECT) is
negative and significant. The implied contribution on productivity is -.019, which is
substantial. For a comparison with Gray who had only one measure of OSH costs, it
is useful to compute the net impact of OSH measures on productivity. This net effect
is -0.012, which is larger than the average impact found in Gray, (-0.003). Two
reasons may explain this result. First, it seems that the enforcement of safety policies
is more intense in Quebec than in the United States, especially during the period under
study (for instance, our rate of inspection is twice as large as that reported in Gray,
1987; see Lanoie, 1992b, for further discussion). Second, it may be the case that OSH
measures are a proxy of the riskiness of an industry; i.e., safety enforcement is targeted
to firms in riskier sectors. These firms have to pay higher payroll taxes (insurance
premia) to the Workers Compensation Board (WCB), which compensates their
injured workers. These insurance premia are in general more expensive in Quebec
than in United States since, in particular, Quebecs compensation regime is more
generous than in most States of the United States (see Lanoie, 1994, for more details
on this issue). In other words, our results may reflect the fact that OSH variables
capture the effect of Quebecs WCB generosity on the cost of labor.12
The coefficients of the other OSH regulation variables are never significant.
An F-test has shown that the OSH regulation variables are globally significant in the
equation. Also note that the results pertaining to the significant OSH variables
(PROTECT, INFRACTION, PREVENT) persist when these variables are included
as the only OSH variables in the equation (see specification (6)).
Concerning the control variables, as expected, the SCALE variable has
everywhere a positive and significant coefficient, which is relatively stable across
specifications. The coefficient on SCALE suggests that the contribution of economies
of scale to TFP growth was about 0.0006 per year, which is relatively small. Similarly,
and as expected, the capacity utilization index variable (CYCLE) has always a positive
and significant coefficient (except in specification 3). The implied contribution of this
variable to TFP growth is 0.029. Finally, the variable related to the share of energy
11
cost (ENERSHARE) has everywhere a positive coefficient, but not stable and not
always significant.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of OSH and environmental regulation
on the rate of growth of productivity in the Quebec manufacturing sector during the
period 1985-88. On one hand, the results showed that both environmental regulation
and OSH protective reassignments have led to a reduction in productivity growth. Of
course, before condemning these regulatory measures because of these results, one
should perform a complete analysis to balance these costs with the benefits of these
measures. On the other hand, the presence of mandatory prevention programs and of
fines for infractions to OSH rules has led to an increase in productivity growth.
Interestingly, this is, to our knowledge, the first result showing that OSH regulation
may have had a positive effect on productivity growth. Such a result may induce
employers to stop perceiving OSH regulation solely as a constraint: it is also a
potential source of productivity and profitability.
12
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TABLE 1
DEFINITION, MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION (SD) and SOURCE
of all VARIABLES
Variables are at the industry level on a yearly basis
VARIABLES      DEFINITION MEAN SD STATISTICAL SOURCE
1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE
TFP : rate of growth of total factor productivity (TFP)@ it 0.0032 0.086
Variables used for the calculation of TFP
1.1 OUTPUT
SHIP : value of shipments (’000 $ 1981)it 2871800 2012500 STAT CAN, 31-203
1.2 INPUTS
MATR : cost of material and supplies used (’000 $ 1981)it 1788700 1438200 STAT CAN, 31-203
ENR : cost of fuel and electricity (’000 $ 1981)it 82443 117020 STAT CAN, 31-203
PRODR : wages of the production and related workers (’000 $ 1981)it 335680 201260 STAT CAN, 31-203
NPRODR : wages of the administrative, office and other non-it
manufacturing employees (’000 $ 1981)
162410 120350 STAT CAN, 31-203
VARIABLES      DEFINITION MEAN SD STATISTICAL SOURCE
The capital is divided into two categories: construction and machinery and equipment. The stock of capital is computed following: K = I + (1-d )K , while the13 it it i i,t-1
costofcapital(C)iscalculatedaccordingtotheequationdevelopedbyChristensenandJorgenson(1969): whereit
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CAPITAL 13
K : stock of capital-Construction ($ 1981)C,it 816.68 836.28 STAT CAN, 1992
I : investments-Construction ($ 1981)C,it 20.39 50.81 Idem
d : rate of depreciation of the capital stock-ConstructionC,i 0.034 0.007 Idem
u : taxation rate of corporations-ConstructionC,t 0.426 0.008 Guide du contribuable canadien
z : value of future tax savings from depreciation deductions-C,t
Construction
0.531 0.011 Idem
k : tax credit for investment-ConstructionC,t 0.055 0.016 Royer et Drew, Impôts et planification
F : rate of capital allowance cost-ConstructionC,t 0.100 0.000 Guide du contribuable canadien
q : price index-ConstructionC,it 128.65 6.34 STAT CAN, 13-211
r : opportunity cost of capital-ConstructionC,t 0.109 0.005 Revue de la Banque du Canada
K : stock of capital-Machinery and equipment ($ 1981)M,it 1066.7 1513.3 STAT CAN, 1992
I : investments-Machinery and equipment ($ 1981)M,it 66.38 133.78 Idem
d : rate of depreciation of capital stock-Machinery andM,i
equipment
0.086 0.021 Idem
VARIABLES      DEFINITION MEAN SD STATISTICAL SOURCE
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u : taxation rate of corporations-Machinery and equipmentM,t 0.426 0.008 Guide du contribuable canadien
z : value of future tax savings from depreciation deductions-M,t
Machinery and equipment
0.718 0.009 Idem
k : tax credit for investment-Machinery and equipmentM,t 0.055 0.016 Royer et Drew, Impôts et planification
F : rate of capital allowance cost-Machinery and equipmentM,t 0.200 0.000 Guide du contribuable canadien
q : price index-Machinery and equipmentM,it 123.25 6.93 STAT CAN, 13-211
r : opportunity cost of capital-Machinery and equipmentM,t 0.109 0.005 Review of the Bank of Canada
2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
2.1 REGULATION VARIABLES
ENVIRONMENT : % in total costs of investments in pollution-control equipment it 0.0008(0.0001)a
0.0017
(0.001)
STAT CAN, unpublished report 
INSPECTION : number of OSH inspections / 1000 full-time employeesit 10.688(-1.631)
8.488
(4.363)
CSST annual reports
REFUSAL : number of interventions from CSST officials for refusals /it
1000 employees
0.248
(0.035)
0.252
(0.347)
Idem
PROTECTIVE : number of protective reassignments / 1000 employeesit 4.504(0.487)
6.094
(2.572)
Idem
INFRACTION : number of penalties imposed (infractions) / 1000 employeesit 0.577(0.192)
1.477
(1.549)
Idem
PREVENT : % of firms that have adopted a prevention programit 0.399(0.041)
0.406
(0.224)
Idem
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2.2 CONTROL VARIABLES
CYCLE : capacity utilisation indexit 81.425(0.993)
10.513
(7.422)
STAT CAN, 31-003 
SCALE : output growth rateit 0.0374(0.0372)
0.1549
(0.1769)
STAT CAN, 31-203
ENERSHARE : share of energy costs in total costsit 10.579(0.621)
.749
(1.712)
STAT CAN, 31-203
2.3 DUMMY VARIABLES-industries
(“miscellaneous mfg. industry” is default)
The industries considered are: food and beverage, tobacco, rubber and
plastics, leather, textiles, clothing, wood, furnitures and fixtures, paper and
allied products, printing and publishing, primary metals, metal fabricating,
machinery, transportation equipment, electrical products, non-metallic
minerals, petroleum and coal products, chemicals.
0.225 0.051
2.4 DUMMY VARIABLES -TIME
1985 is default. 0.250 0.436
a The number in parenthesis is the value for the variable in first-difference.
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TABLE 2
The TFP Equation (N=59), Coefficients (t-stastistics) 1
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ENVIRONMENT -10.613
(-1.84) ——
-7.768**
(-2.34)
-14.265**
(-4.75)
-12.452**
(-2.05)
-5.778
(-1.029)
INSPECTION 0.001
(0.41)
-0.001
(-0.24) ——
0.0003
(0.17)
0.0004
(0.22) ——
REFUSAL 0.019
(1.14)
0.017
(1.04) ——
0.025*
(1.68)
0.019
(1.20) ——
PROTECTIVE -0.040*
(-1.91)
-0.046**
(-2.16) ——
-0.043**
(-3.01)
-0.044**
(-2.23)
-0.031
(-1.43)
INFRACTION 0.009**
(3.02)
0.009**
(3.16) ——
0.009**
(3.38)
0.006**
(2.21)
0.005**
(1.98)
PREVENT 0.154**
(2.86)
0.163**
(2.97) ——
0.151**
(4.48)
0.119**
(2.27)
0.148**
(2.34)
SCALE 0.019**
(2.94)
0.023**
(3.54)
0.013**
(2.57) ——
0.018**
(3.28)
0.022**
(3.21)
CYCLE 0.030**
 (2.73)
0.023**
(2.17)
-0.008
(-1.19)
0.036**
(5.47)
0.015
(1.37)
0.010
(0.80)
ENERSHARE 0.012
(1.19)
0.018*
(1.85)
0.001
(0.11)
0.019**
(2.46) ——
0.009
(0.93)
Intercept 0.029
(0.38)
0.043
(0.56)
-0.001
(-0.004)
0.025
(0.37)
0.050
(0.59)
0.026
(0.33)
R) 2 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.77 0.56 0.54
Log L 134.14 131.80 138.54 150.38 129.71 128.26
1 Each specification includes 18 industry dummies and 2 time dummies. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tail test) * Statistically significant at the 10% level (two-tail test)
